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Animal Disease and Narratives of Nature: Farmers’ Reactions to the Neoliberal 
Governance of Bovine Tuberculosis 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between neoliberal styles of animal disease governance 
and farmers’ understandings of disease and nature. In the UK, new styles of animal disease 
governance has promised to shift the costs and responsibilities of disease management to 
farmers, creating opportunities for farmers to take responsibility for disease control 
themselves and opening up new markets for disease control interventions. Focusing on the 
management of bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) and drawing on interviews with 65 cattle farmers, 
the paper examines how farmer responses to these new styles of animal disease governance 
are shaped by their own knowledges and understandings of nature and disease. In particular, 
the paper examines how two key narratives of nature – the idea of ‘natural balance’ and 
‘clean and dirty badgers’ – lead farmers to think about the control of bTB in wildlife (such as 
the choice between badger culling and/or vaccination) in very specific ways. However, whilst 
discourses of cost and responsibility appear to open up choice opportunities for farmers, that 
choice is constrained when viewed from the perspective of farmer subjectivities and 
narratives of nature. Discourses of neoliberalism as control rather than choice are therefore 
revealed, drawing attention to the complexities and plural strategies of neoliberal governance. 
 
Keywords: Bovine TB; Badger Culling; Badger Vaccination; Nature; Neoliberalism; 
Partnership Governance; Balance of Nature; Equilibrium. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to Braun (2007, p.6), techniques to manage animal disease should not be seen as 
just a set of benign practices to ‘make life safe’, but as geopolitical regimes extending forms 
of sovereign power around the world. In Braun’s view, the pursuit of biosecurity has become 
inexorably intertwined with neoliberal attempts of global economic integration. The 
significance of the relationship between neoliberalism and animal disease governance is noted 
in the agricultural biosecurity literature (see e.g., Enticott, 2013; Higgins and Dibden, 2011; 
Maye et al., 2012; Waage and Mumford, 2008), particularly its prominence in international 
policy circles as a means to facilitate (through international laws, measures and standards) the 
free and safe movement of animals, agricultural products and practices around the world. 
 
In this neoliberal regime, it is not just certain biological futures and versions of nature that 
come to be specified, but also the tools by which to manage animal disease. Beyond the 
global standardisation of diagnostic tools, a reliance on the market has begun to saturate 
governments’ approaches to biosecurity around the world, just as it has in other areas of 
environmental governance (Castree, 2008a, 2008b). Common strategies under neoliberalism 
include the incorporation of market strategies into previously State-led functions and the 
emergence of partnerships that devolve responsibilities to private and/or civil society groups 
(Hodge and Adams, 2012; Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
 
For some, these global neoliberal approaches to animal disease governance displace more 
nuanced ‘local’ explanations and practices of animal disease management (Braun, 2007; 
Hinchliffe, 2008). Yet, there is also recognition that ‘neoliberalisation’ (i.e., a set of processes 
that enact free market ideology) is far from monolithic and does not lead to uniform practices 
of neoliberal rule (Maye et al., 2012, p.152); it is, in other words, a ‘spatiotemporally variable 
process’ (Castree 2008a, p. 137, original emphasis). Peck et al. (2010, p.96) characterise 
neoliberalisation as a vast number of “local trajectories, contingent forms and hybrid 
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assemblages” of capitalist logic. This renders the ‘neoliberal project’ more than just an 
expression of particular political-economic rationalities (Barnett, 2009) and views 
neoliberalisation as a mix of emergent activities, the outcome of complex partnerships, 
negotiations and social and political dynamics. For the governance of animal disease, this can 
mean that the intersection of neoliberalism with local practices may result in approaches with 
distinct local characteristics as they emerge ‘out of complex articulations between actors in 
multiple locations’ (Higgins and Larner, 2010, p.10) to make them workable across 
agricultural space. 
 
In seeking to understand how approaches to animal disease are made, it therefore pays to be 
“attentive to both the local peculiarities and the general features of neoliberalism” (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002, p.388 emphasis in original). This paper examines neoliberalisation via an 
analysis of the relationship between local animal disease practices and the introduction of 
partnership forms of neoliberal governance for one particular animal disease – bovine 
Tuberculosis (hereafter bTB) – in England. Using the phrase ‘cost and responsibility sharing’, 
UK Governments have since the early 2000s sought to encourage new forms of animal 
disease governance involving a mix of public and private providers. For bTB, this has 
resulted in a landscape of choice in which farmers take responsibility for disease control 
themselves and markets for disease control interventions are developed. The paper analyses 
farmer reactions to these new styles of governance. Specifically, it examines how farmer 
responses to new styles of animal disease governance are shaped by their own knowledges 
and understandings of nature and disease. 
 
Narratives and beliefs of nature and wildlife have been shown to be influential in the 
acceptance of management plans for a range of different environmental problems (Dandy et 
al., 2012; Eden and Bear, 2011; Robbins, 2006). This paper seeks to extend these analyses to 
show how farmers’ understandings of disease and nature correspond with the imaginations of 
nature and disease within different market-based approaches to the management of animal 
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disease. In doing so, it draws attention to the social domain in narratives of neoliberalism 
(Barnett, 2009) and problematises Atkins and Robinson’s (2013, p. 1373) call to develop 
more spatially nuanced policy for bTB and badgers. Discourses of neoliberalism are revealed 
as versions of government control rather than true forms of ‘choice’. It reveals the 
complexities and plurality of neoliberal governance, combining in this case state actors with 
farmers and other private organisations, but with the state required to maintain some 
responsibility. As Hodge and Adams (2012: 474) put it, “…in many instances approaches 
characterised as neoliberal may reasonably be interpreted as representing an increasing degree 
of intervention by the state. Neoliberalisation needs to be understood in the context of the 
evolution of state and private responsibility…”. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. 
The next section reviews developments within UK bTB policy and links the transition 
towards market-based modes of neoliberal governing to Castree’s (2008a) ‘minimal state’ 
model. The main empirical part of the paper examines farmer beliefs about nature and the role 
they play in determining farmers’ preference for methods to control the spread of bTB from 
badgers to cattle. The paper concludes with some general remarks about the neoliberalisation 
of animal disease control and the evolution of partnership governance. 
 
 
2. Governing Bovine Tuberculosis in the UK 
 
This section begins with an overview of bTB governance. It shows how the management of 
bTB is shifting from state to partnership styles of governance, where the Government is still 
involved in governing bTB but seeks to devolve some responsibilities to the private sector, 
and considers the relationship of these styles of governance with beliefs and understandings 
of disease and nature. 
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Bovine Tuberculosis and New Styles of Animal Health Governance in the UK 
 
BTB is a major biological, economic and political issue in Great Britain. It is regarded by the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) as one of the most difficult 
animal health issues facing England in particular1. In the 1980s, the disease was isolated to 
several hot-spots in the south-west of England. By 2010, 10.8% of herds in England had a 
recorded bTB incident, and as high as 22.7% in the West and South-West, leading to the 
slaughter of 25,000 cattle (Defra, 2011a). Each bTB incident is estimated to cost £30,000. 
About £10,000 of this cost falls to farmers; the emotional trauma following the loss of cattle 
to bTB can also be considerable (Defra, 2010; Farm Crisis Network, 2009). The Government 
spends £100million a year on testing and compensation, which is managed by the Animal 
Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA) and delivered by private veterinary 
surgeons. The management of the disease is controversial because wildlife – specifically 
badgers – is implicated in the spread of bTB. That badgers are protected and culturally iconic 
(Cassidy, 2012) has meant that decisions to cull badgers to control bTB in cattle have proved 
contentious. BTB has become a ‘political disease’ (Grant, 2009), with arguments between 
politicians, farmers, scientists and conservationists over the best way to manage the disease 
(see also: Atkins and Robinson, 2013; Enticott, 2001, 2008a; Maye et al, 2013). 
 
Historically, debates over the management of bTB have assumed that Government would be 
responsible and accountable. In fact, arguments over the control of badgers have 
overshadowed significant changes to the governance of animal disease in general and a 
movement towards neoliberal styles of governing animal disease. Enticott et al’s (2012) 
review of veterinary expertise suggests that the UK Governments have sought to 
fundamentally redistribute the costs and responsibilities of animal health. This agenda was 
1
 In the UK, policy responsibilities for bTB are devolved to Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This 
paper focuses on the governance of bTB in England. 
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prompted by the spiralling costs of dealing with disease outbreaks, such as the 2001 Foot and 
Mouth Disease outbreak, whilst the European Union (EC, 2007) has pressed for a rebalancing 
of responsibilities for the management and prevention of livestock disease towards private 
producers. The UK’s 2004 Animal Health and Welfare Strategy (Defra, 2004) reflects these 
changes, laying primary responsibility for disease control firmly on livestock keepers. The 
strategy signals a major shift away from government taking the lead, except where it had 
legal responsibilities for disease control, food assurance and animal welfare. The outbreak of 
Bluetongue virus in 2008 provided a first example of these new arrangements. Rather than 
direct Government intervention, a solution was developed by brokering a strategic 
collaboration between the veterinary profession and farming groups to encourage vaccination 
of cattle. In the old regime, compensation to farmers would also have been offered, but none 
was offered in this case. Indeed, for other diseases, UK Governments have sought to reduce 
compensation to farmers for livestock slaughtered as a result of disease outbreaks to shift the 
burden of biosecurity responsibility to farmers rather than reward poor practice (NAO, 2003). 
 
The state has also fundamentally altered its approach to disease control through strategies of 
privatisation and/or ‘agencification’. ‘Agencification’ is the process by which the 
implementation of policy is hived off into separate units to provide the freedom to manage 
their activities and thereby improve the efficiency and quality of service delivery using the 
tools more commonly associated with the private sector. Examples include the creation of the 
Animal Health Agency in 2007. Formed from the old State Veterinary Service (SVS), it has 
responsibility for implementing government policies aimed at preventing or managing 
outbreaks of serious animal diseases, protecting the welfare of farmed animals and 
safeguarding public health from animal borne disease. As Enticott et al (2012) argue, this has 
had significant effects: it has removed animal disease expertise from central government, 
making it more difficult for them to give advice effectively and easier for their advice to be 
ignored (see also Wilkinson, 2011). 
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These trends are not UK-specific; just as other neoliberal policies have diffused around the 
globe (Peck and Theodore, 2010; Prince, 2010), so too has a global mobility of animal disease 
policy solutions redefined its governance in the UK. Discourses of ‘cost and responsibility 
sharing’ therefore borrow heavily from their implementation in countries like Australia and 
New Zealand. In these countries, the desire to preserve agricultural exports amid adverse 
economic conditions led to new institutional arrangements in which the State’s role in 
managing disease was transformed as costs and responsibilities were devolved to farmers and 
new quasi-governmental organisations (Lehane, 1996; More, 2007). For example, borne out 
of New Zealand’s financial crisis in the 1980s, the 1993 Biosecurity Act established National 
Pest Management Agencies (NPMAs) to resolve outbreaks of animal disease. NPMAs such 
as the Animal Health Board were formed by farming organisations in partnership with local 
and national governments. Disease control operations were financed by farmers who, as a 
result, had a direct say in disease control policy (Enticott, 2013). 
 
Discourses of cost and responsibility sharing have proved increasingly popular with UK 
Governments as they have sought to deal with bTB (Enticott and Franklin, 2009). Launching 
its first strategic framework for the control of bTB in 2005 (Defra, 2005), ‘partnership’ was 
touted as the essential ingredient. Whilst these discourses of partnership existed at different 
institutional scales (Enticott and Franklin, 2009), farmers were identified as key actors who 
needed to ‘individually and collectively, take responsibility for managing risks to their herds 
from bTB’. Control of bTB, Defra argued, was not a responsibility of taxpayers, but by ‘cattle 
farmers…individually and collectively, [taking] responsibility for managing risks to their 
herds from bTB…and bearing a progressively greater share of the costs of bovine 
tuberculosis controls’ (ibid., p. 41). 
 
The concept of disease responsibility has manifested in different guises. One way has been 
through Defra’s attempts to develop markets for wildlife control interventions to control bTB. 
In 2008, the Labour Government concluded that, based on the current scientific advice, 
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badger culling was not an appropriate option and instead recommended that badgers should 
be vaccinated. Six areas of England were identified in which badgers would be vaccinated. 
Unlike previous wildlife control interventions, these areas would not act as a scientific trial to 
test the effectiveness of vaccination, and nor would badgers be vaccinated by the 
Government. Instead, the main aim was to “kickstart an industry in badger vaccination and 
build the capacity of trained expertise in the country” (Wilson quoted in EFRACOM., 2013, 
p.Ev. 4). The strategy relied on creating a market amongst pest control companies to compete 
for vaccination contracts that the Government would pay for. Moreover, the project aimed to 
train “lay vaccinators” – farmers and members of the public with an interest in badger 
conservation – to provide animal health services to the farming industry. 
 
An alternative strategy has been to pass the choice of wildlife control to farmers themselves. 
Following the election of the new Conservative-led coalition Government in 2010, attempts 
to eradicate bTB through new policies further emphasised the role of farmer responsibility. 
The new government argued that, to resolve bTB, it needed to give “farmers more control and 
choice…empowering the industry to take greater responsibility for tackling TB; sharing and 
reducing the cost of TB and ensuring farmers have the right incentives” (Defra, 2011b, p.17). 
Landowners and farmers were encouraged to establish private wildlife control companies to 
limit bTB infections from cattle. Rather than vaccinate badgers, however, the companies 
would cull them. Farmer groups would have to apply for a culling licence from Defra and 
fulfil various criteria, but they would fund and manage the culling operations themselves once 
the licence was awarded. The first two licences were awarded in 2012 and culling began in 
2013. If the first two pilot schemes were deemed a success, up to ten additional licences were 
scheduled to be awarded annually from 2014. The subsequent independent evaluation of the 
pilot culls has put back this national roll out, with new licences unlikely to be issued before 
2015. Nevertheless, farmers are being given a choice in the management of bTB. Referring to 
the culling options, Jim Paice, the (now former) agriculture minister in charge of the policy at 
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the time of the survey was clear about this, stating that “if [farmers] don’t want to do it, they 
don’t have to: it’s entirely up to them” (Paice quoted in BBC, 2011). 
 
Responding to Neoliberal Animal Disease Policy: The Role of Cultural Understandings of 
Disease 
 
Whilst it is possible to conceptualise these changes to the governance of animal health as a 
neoliberal ‘hollowing out of the state’, this interpretation is problematised by the variable 
character of neoliberalism as it is implemented in different places. Moreover, neoliberalism is 
not knowingly implemented by central government and delivered downwards to a local level 
where proposed policy options are consented or rejected. The process of governmentality is 
more fluid and emergent than this: through implementation and interaction with local cultures 
and environments, neoliberalism undergoes frequent translations and emerges out of complex 
negotiations. Work on “specific modalities” of nature’s neoliberalisation (Castree, 2008b, 
p.157 emphasis in original) provides useful insight into this translational process. Castree 
(2008a) argues that neoliberalisation provides different ‘environmental fixes’ to enable 
private organisations, the state and other stakeholders a means to maintain economic growth. 
Neoliberal governance therefore takes different forms, including situations (as is the case with 
bTB) where the state must take some responsibility for relations between the private sector, 
the state and nature even though it may lack the resources and capacity to deal with the 
problems in these relationships (Hodge and Adams, 2012, p.473). As well as ‘hollowing out’ 
the state, Castree (2008a) identifies a second means to deal with this problem: a ‘minimal 
state’ model. This characterisation fits with the partnership model emerging to govern bTB. 
 
Hodge and Adam’s (2012) also suggest that neoliberalism and neoliberalisation now embrace 
an increasingly divergent range of approaches. They suggest that analysis of government 
must assess the operation of market instruments at a more detailed and contingent level. This 
work re-asserts the essential role of the State in the neoliberal project and confirms the idea 
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that neoliberalism can “only exist in the form of messy hybrids” (Peck, 2010, p.7). Hodge and 
Adams (2012: p. 481) regard neoliberalism as a form of “institutional blending”, which 
“reflects the complexity of the processes of transfer and decomposition of property, the 
emergence of organisations with a mix of public and private characteristics and the 
development of partnerships”. 
 
If neoliberal solutions are translated differently, this may be attributed to local cultures, 
beliefs and narratives surrounding the nature of disease, or other social and economic factors. 
In other words, people’s narratives and beliefs about the nature of disease can influence the 
way certain neoliberal policy trajectories are constructed in favour of others. That is to say, 
beliefs about the ways in which disease can be transmitted and spread influence the 
acceptance or rejection of particular neoliberal futures and provide a guide to more acceptable 
versions. Farmer views about nature and disease form an important part of the emergent 
activities that make up bTB governance. This is already evident as forms of neoliberal animal 
governance attempt to be implemented around the globe. Firstly, the interaction of local 
agricultural priorities and international disease control regulations leads to a variegated 
landscape of disease control policy. Rather than standardised approaches to managing 
disease, these relationships lead to new hybrid forms of governance that vary from place to 
place. For example, despite the presence of standardised international trading laws, Dibden et 
al. (2011) argue that biosecurity regulations are not implemented in the same way in all 
places. Despite attempts to harmonise trade rules and view biosecurity as an international 
territory, perceptions of the risks to national biosecurity identities can still lead to a 
divergence in biosecurity practices and a protection of national agricultural territory (see also 
Higgins and Larner, 2010). Secondly, attempts to develop new relationships between disease 
experts, such as vets and farmers, have tended to fall flat, due to farmers’ socio-economic 
priorities and attitudes to disease control. For example, Defra’s Animal Health and Welfare 
Strategy has sought to redefine the role of vets as entrepreneurs who can successfully 
navigate rural development funding streams and demonstrate their market value to farmers 
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(Enticott et al, 2012). However, farmers seem unwilling to act as demanding customers, 
preferring to rely on their vet in emergencies only, are slow to recognise how their vet can 
add value to their farming business (Lowe, 2009), and are driven more by immediate value-
for-money concerns (Defra, 2007). 
 
It is also likely that farmers’ reactions to new styles of governing animal disease will be 
influenced by their own understandings of what disease is and their understandings of disease 
aetiology (Enticott, 2008b). The significance of cultural practices and beliefs about nature has 
long been recognised in science and technology studies (Wynne, 1992). In agriculture, 
cultural beliefs can inform styles of knowledge production or ideas of what constitutes 
appropriate behaviour – such as good farming (Burton, 2004; Silvasti, 2003). Studies of 
agricultural biosecurity draw attention to local health beliefs as enablers or disablers for 
policy uptake. Heffernan et al’s (2008a) work on the uptake of vaccination for FMD in 
Bolivia, for example, shows how uptake and resistance to the vaccine reflected local health 
beliefs. Uptake they argued was not due to scientific or economic arguments, but because of a 
discourse which was ‘reinvented’ to fit in with local beliefs that FMD was caused by heat. 
Enticott’s (2008b) work on bTB in the UK also notes how farmers have developed their own 
understandings of the disease through individual experience and collective exchanges of 
accounts of bTB breakdowns, which have formed ‘candidate’ farms, farmers, cattle and 
badgers that are likely to suffer from the disease. These classifications are always vulnerable 
and luck plays a strong role in disease beliefs. 
 
This research is consistent with other work on the way narratives and philosophies of nature 
influence the acceptability of different environmental management practices. In relation to 
deer management, Dandy et al. (2012) examine the acceptability of control methods such as 
culling, fencing, the use of ‘scarers’ to affect deer behaviour and changes to human 
behaviour. Acceptability of these methods is related to different histories, experiences and 
understandings of nature. They argue that attitudes towards control methods are related to 
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underlying beliefs about nature in general. These natural beliefs or narratives of nature relate 
to ideas of naturalness and over-abundance. Nature is understood to have natural predators 
and their own natural spaces, but encroachment into these spaces can lead to unnatural 
populations. Similarly, Buller (2008) shows how different philosophies of nature – distinct 
sets of moral and ethical reasonings, or beliefs about fairness and nature – are tied up in the 
acceptance of rural wildlife management, such as the re-introduction of wild species. 
Frequently, these philosophical beliefs of nature invoke ideas of ‘natural balance’ or 
‘equilibrium’ to justify particular forms of nature management. Eden and Bear (2011) also 
show how certain narratives of nature – or what they call ‘lay ecologies’ – influence how 
anglers support different interventions designed to facilitate fish health. Beliefs in ‘natural 
equilibrium’ or ‘a balance to nature’ led some anglers to argue that there was no need to 
control predating birds like Cormorants, or fish like Pike, because nature always returns to its 
own level. However, these narratives of nature are also spatial: nature can find its own level, 
but some animals and birds can find themselves out of place and threatening these self-
regulating systems. What is clear from this work, however, is that these different views 
rationalise different forms of management, ranging from non-intervention to attempts to 
restore natural equilibrium or to directly restore natural habitats. 
 
When it comes to the governance of bTB, it should be no surprise therefore to see neoliberal 
solutions imported from other countries playing out in different ways. Firstly, in a policy 
environment where farmers are being given more ‘choice’ over the management of bTB, 
different understandings of nature and disease are likely to affect the acceptability of different 
interventions. Secondly, it should also be expected that idealised neoliberal solutions will 
depart from their idealised pathways as they interact with these natural understandings. The 
paper turns now to examine how farmers’ views of nature and disease affect the acceptability 
and preference of the two solutions to bTB (badger vaccination and culling) currently 
available to them and how this may influence partnership modes of bTB governance. 
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3. Methodology 
 
In exploring the extent to which beliefs about nature affect the roll out of neoliberal solutions 
to bTB, we draw on 65 interviews with cattle farmers in three study areas in the West and 
South West regions of England. The interviews are part of a larger social science study 
examining farmers’ confidence in bTB control methods (badger vaccination and culling) and 
the role of government in managing bTB. The three study areas are in Stroud 
(Gloucestershire), Congleton (Cheshire) and Great Torrington (Devon) (Figure 1). In one of 
the areas (Stroud in Gloucestershire), badger vaccination has been used as part of Defra’s 
Badger Vaccination Deployment Project (BVDP). The study locations are all areas where 
bTB is high, although bTB disease prevalence is lower in Congleton compared to Stroud and 
Great Torrington. 
 
---Insert Figure 1 here --- 
 
The interviews were completed in October and November 2011 and were mostly qualitative 
in nature. They were carried out around the time that the Coalition Government had 
announced its latest bTB policy, including plans to issue licences for groups of farmers to 
control wildlife. The interviews were intended to illuminate farmer responses to the proposal 
and to reveal contextual issues and important micro-social processes and to enliven the 
messiness of ‘real world policy processes’ (Henwood et al., 2010). A 'biographical narrative 
approach' (Rist, 1994) was developed in order to obtain a detailed understanding of the local, 
cultural and social contexts that influence farmer belief systems and attitudes towards bTB 
and badger control. This approach recognises the importance of embedding risk research 
within wider social and political contexts; such factors, it argues, influence how risk is 
constructed and understood by individuals. In this case, the approach encouraged farmers to 
talk about their experiences and attitudes to badger control options in an open, reflective 
manner. The schedule was designed with two key requirements in mind. Firstly, in line with 
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the approach of Henwood et al. (2010), the interview was designed to encourage farmers to 
outline, in their terms, their farm’s bTB and farming histories, including past and current 
experiences of the disease, impacts the disease has had and was having on them and their 
farm enterprise, and their understanding and knowledge of badger vaccination and badger 
ecology. Secondly, the interviews aimed to capture farmers’ views of bTB policy and badger 
control options. 
 
Farmers selected for interview were identified from the results of an earlier telephone survey 
of 341 farmers and selected based on their levels of trust in government, confidence in badger 
vaccination, and herd size/type (see Maye et al, 2013). The interview transcripts were 
imported into NVivo9 and coded for analysis. Of the 65 interview participants, 37 had beef 
herds, 26 dairy and two had both dairy and beef cattle (see Table 1). These characteristics are 
broadly representative of the total populations in each area. Dairy herds are generally larger 
than beef (133 compared to 110) and the largest herd was a farm which kept 1300 cattle 
(milking 600 cows). Farm sizes varied significantly between the three study areas. Similar to 
herd size, farms in Great Torrington are larger than the overall sample average and smallest in 
Congleton. Respondents also had a range of different experiences with bTB. Some farmers 
had not experienced any bTB breakdowns, whereas others had regular and sometimes major 
breakdowns. For example, one dairy farmer in Great Torrington has been under bTB 
restriction for the last twelve years and has lost 200 cattle. Overall, the pattern of bTB on the 
sample of 65 farms surveyed reflects the prevalence of bTB in the study areas, especially in 
Stroud and Great Torrington, with the majority [56 of the 65] having experienced at least one 
bTB breakdown. Most farms surveyed [44 out of 65] had had a bTB outbreak in the previous 
five years and 16 had had a breakdown in 2011. In the Congleton study area, the pattern of 
bTB in the sample is different. Six of the 22 farms had never had bTB and few had 
experienced a major breakdown. Farmers in the north of this area had a relatively low 
incidence of bTB, whereas bTB prevalence in the south was much higher. 
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--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
 
 
4. Responding to Responsibility: The Role of Narratives of Nature 
 
Cost Sharing and Responsibility – Farmers’ Responses 
 
In principle, the majority of farmers interviewed were not against the idea of taking more 
responsibility for the management of bTB. This included both farm-specific activities, such as 
improving biosecurity, as well as becoming involved in managing badger policies. Farmer 
involvement in badger culling policies was justified on three grounds. Firstly, farmers were 
involved ‘at the sharp end’ which gave them rights to control policy. Secondly, interviewees 
spoke of the ‘practical wisdom’ possessed by farmers which needed to be incorporated into 
policy making processes so that policies ‘don’t get in the way of farming practice’. Thirdly, 
farmers suggested that there was a greater industry good to be had from farmers working 
together to eradicate the disease. As one farmer suggested: “You would go along with it, 
wouldn’t you, for the sakes of all the other farmers” (C502). However, as recognised by 
Heffernan et al (2008b), this sense of farmers trusting each other to work for the common 
good is overly idealistic. Indeed, attitudes towards farmers’ responsibilities in bTB policy 
varied according to farmers’ own experiences of bTB. Farmers who have not had significant 
problems with bTB held less favourable attitudes to contributing financially to bTB controls. 
Those who had the disease, especially those who have lost the greatest number of cattle to it, 
were much happier to shoulder some, if not all, of the cost. 
 
Farmers’ acceptance of discourses of responsibility were frequently reluctant and not 
unconditional. This was largely because of farmers’ perceptions of the fairness of the policy. 
It was common for farmers to suggest that ideas of responsibility had been pushed onto the 
agricultural industry because of the failings of the government. In this context, the idea of 
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farmers paying for wildlife controls provoked either anger at incompetent politicians or 
resigned acceptance that the government were no longer in the position to afford to do it 
themselves. Discourses of responsibility were not simply about shifting the costs of bTB, but 
also the blame. Farmers therefore perceived the government to be handing over their ‘dirty 
work’ and redirecting public outrage over any badger culling policies towards farmers. There 
was also concern that any cost and responsibility sharing should be balanced with a 
‘commitment from both sides if it is to work’ (C576). Farmers’ distrust of Government led 
many to worry over the extent to which they would have any choice over measures that they 
could end up paying for. Farmers believed it was only fair that they contributed to measures 
that had a guarantee of success. Farmers spoke about the lack of proof regarding the efficacy 
of badger vaccination, coupled with concerns regarding its practicality and high cost. Yet, the 
prospect of Government deciding to vaccinate badgers and passing those costs on to farmers 
appeared real. As one farmer complained, “If the ministry decides that wildlife wants to be 
vaccinated, then why should I pay to have badgers vaccinated?” (C518). 
 
In relation to badger cull proposals, farmers were also keen to see that costs were distributed 
fairly between all farmers. However, farmers that supported the idea of paying for a badger 
cull were also concerned that they had little freedom to organise it in the best possible 
manner. One farmer who was responsible for creating a badger cull company complained that 
the rules laid down by the Government ‘were not the ideal way of doing it, but it is what we 
have been given…we perhaps don’t like it, don’t agree with it…but this is the only offer on 
the table’ (C1571). This realism was by no means shared by all farmers. Others called for 
other methods to be used or for badgers to be removed from the protected species list to allow 
farmers ‘to sort the problem out in the areas where it was’ (C1581). Underlying these 
rejections of cost and responsibility sharing were a distinct set of understandings of nature 
and disease. These are explored in the next section. 
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Farmers’ Understandings of Disease and Nature 
 
As with previous work on the acceptance of wildlife control strategies, a number of specific 
beliefs, narratives and philosophies of nature emerged during the interviews which were 
deployed when farmers were considering the new styles of bTB management proposed by the 
Government. Two narratives of nature are prominent – a ‘balance of nature’ narrative and a 
‘‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ badgers’ narrative. These cultural understandings of nature explain why 
farmers have preference for certain wildlife control methods over others, but they are not 
always compatible and in turn reveal the challenges to be negotiated in new styles of 
partnership governance for bTB. 
 
Farmers in all areas believed the risk from bTB was “high” or “very high”. Many felt the risk 
was “always there” (C502) or “in the back of your mind all the time...you hold your breath a 
bit” (C536). Even farmers who did not record bTB problems recognised the risk bTB posed to 
their business, usually with reference to the fact that most neighbours around them have had 
or have bTB. Those that did not have the disease described themselves as “very lucky” 
(GT1055) or as “like lightening striking…It might get you, it might not” (C536). Farmers 
explained theirs and others’ breakdowns in relation to transmission from badgers. There was a 
general consensus that badgers played an important role in transmitting disease. Farmers 
recognized that other wildlife (such as deer) might play a role. Risk of transmission from 
cattle was also accepted, but this was thought to be much reduced because of strict cattle 
testing controls imposed by Defra. Others pointed to ‘closed herds’ (which do not buy in 
stock) as examples of the importance of badgers to cattle transmission. Farmers therefore 
accepted that badgers needed to be controlled as part of any attempt to control bTB. The 
following quote reflects this view. 
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“Whether it is in the wildlife around this area, I don’t know. I think they play a part in 
it, definitely. It’s the old argument: if you’re going to control it in the cows, then it 
has to be controlled in the wild as well” (C548). 
 
Attitudes to culling badgers did not simply rest on their role in transmitting bTB. Rather, 
farmers pointed out that the problem lay with the badger population rather than individual 
badgers. Here, farmers drew on familiar discourses of nature that emphasise the role of 
balance and equilibrium and the dangers of human interference with nature’s balance. The 
belief amongst farmers was that there were too many badgers and that the population was ‘out 
of control’. For example: 
 
“I love to see them, like probably 95% of farmers do, 99%, I mean most people do, I 
mean I love to see them, but what I don't like is when there is far too many of them 
and they are getting riddled with disease” (GT1117). 
 
Here farmers express ambiguous and contradictory feelings towards badgers. On the one 
hand, farmers expressed appreciation and affection for badgers, suggesting that it was a 
delight to see them. Respondents used past memories of (rare) badger sightings. As one 
farmer put it, “When I were a child and I saw a badger, I thought it was fantastic... But now it 
doesn’t mean anything, there are just so many about” (C518). 
 
The over-population of badgers had not only spoilt the rare glimpses of secretive badgers – 
their very natural characteristics – but it was also responsible for spreading disease to cattle as 
well. This temporal aspect to the ‘right’ population level for badgers is linked to the ways the 
balance of nature was maintained previously. For example, farmers referred to the way 
farmers and gamekeepers used to keep badger populations in balance in the past. The past 
was a period when country knowledge and craft was applied in order that “everything was 
kept in a balance” (C502). Similarly, farmers applied the same over-population arguments to 
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other pests (e.g. foxes): that when there are too many of them, nature needs to be rebalanced 
through forms of population control. 
 
A key element of farmers’ over-population argument was that the badger population had been 
thrown out of kilter by the Badger Protection Act. Badgers were first protected by the 1973 
Badger Act which was strengthened and amended by the 1993 Badger Protection Act. 
Badgers are also protected by the European Commission’s Habitat Directive and are a species 
listed in the Bern Convention for protection. For many farmers, the unbalancing of the badger 
population can be traced back to the moment badgers were first protected:  
 
“There are too many badgers for their own good, I would think. I come from an era 
when the local gamekeeper would keep badgers under control, like any vermin, 
because of the damage they do… It's funny how TB increased when the badger was 
protected” (GT1035). 
 
For badgers, the situation was made worse by the fact that they have no natural predators that 
could naturally control their population. Indeed, it was suggested that the protection of 
badgers was in danger of throwing all of nature out of balance: as the badger population grew, 
so they were predating on other animals such as hedgehogs and ground nesting birds to such a 
level that those aspects of nature were in danger. In short, then, farmers across all areas 
highlighted a concern for a kind of moral order of nature. Badgers were like all other aspects 
of nature in that there was an appropriate level for them. Beyond, or beneath, that level, 
nature required assistance to rebalance it against other pressures or social activities. Farmers 
believed that preventing badgers being persecuted was correct, but attempts to rebalance the 
population had simply gone too far, and badgers’ population level was now a key factor in the 
spread of the disease, as this farmer argued: 
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“…if you've got lots and lots of them, it's like anything, there are too many badgers in 
certain places and when you have too many badgers you get sickness. It's the same 
with probably too many cows in one place - if one or two are sick it will spread 
(GT1096)”. 
 
The balance of nature discourse suggests a universal problem, one in which all badgers are 
seen as a problem in all areas. However, badgers were also understood by farmers in a more 
nuanced and spatial manner. In this second narrative of nature, farmers distinguished between 
‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ badgers. Farmers in all three case study areas described badgers in these 
terms – i.e. some badgers are dirty because they are infected with bTB, whilst others are clean 
and healthy. For instance, a number of farmers who had not been affected by bTB or were not 
currently under restriction, considered their badgers to be an asset, protecting them from 
infection. As one beef farmer in Stroud explained: “I don’t mind having badgers on the farm 
if they’re all right. If they’re healthy you should leave them alone” (S307). Another Stroud 
farmer commented: “We do have quite a lot of badgers on the farm, but they are obviously 
clear, so we don’t interfere with them and keep them where they are and that always seems to 
work” (S284).  
 
This narrative of ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ also applied to areas of farmland as a whole. In other 
words, farmers developed a highly spatialised understanding of disease risk. The variability of 
bTB risks could exist at quite a broad geographical scale. For example, in the Congleton 
study area, interviewees identified particularly ‘bad’ areas that were prone to bTB (e.g. 
Manifold Valley and the top of the Biddulph Tor in the North Staffordshire section of the 
Congleton study area), and other areas that were seen as ‘safe’ or ‘good’. Farmers in the three 
study areas also identified bTB risks at the farm scale, highlighting parts of their farm, 
specific fields or surrounding areas that were prone to bTB, usually particular fields or parcels 
of land. Similarly, farmers understood that certain landscape features such as woodlands next 
to fields or disused railways could act as a “transmitting highway for the bTB disease” 
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(C1581). For example, in this quote a farmer recalls what happened when he used a field 
known to be ‘bad’ for bTB:  
 
“We were tight for land at the time so we had to put some stock in again. We put 
some younger beef animals in there again. We just needed to put them in there for 
two weeks. We took them away after the two weeks and we tested again (60 days 
later) and another 18 out of the 20 went (massive great lumps again) (GT1080)”. 
 
This spatialisation of TB risk at a farm/field scale is not always straightforward. In the 
example above, the farmer went on to explain how he used the field for old barren cattle in 
the expectation that they would get bTB. The compensation he would receive would be 
higher than their sale value. At the next bTB test, however, all the cows passed. The clean and 
dirty narrative therefore both partly supports and challenges the idea of a natural equilibrium. 
On the one hand, it suggests a variable rather than a universal understanding of nature. The 
spread of bTB in and from badgers cannot simply be understood in population terms: nature 
is too varied and changing for that to work. On the other hand, the language of clean and dirty 
allows farmers to spatialise the spread of the disease. Unexpected infections in areas known 
to be ‘clean’ can be attributed to ‘dirty’ badgers that are out of place in the countryside and 
can reinforce the belief that the badger population is out of control.  
 
Narratives of Nature and Farmer Preference for Wildlife Control 
 
Despite their apparent opposition, farmers frequently deployed both of these narratives of 
nature and disease at the same time: they see a general problem with an uncontrolled 
expansion of the badger population and the associated effects on disease levels and the 
absence of other wildlife. However, farmers are also wary of over-generalising at the expense 
of losing the protection of the ‘clean’ badger. Jointly however, these narratives play a 
significant role in determining farmers’ preference for methods to control the spread of bTB 
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from badgers to cattle. But at the same time, they go some way to questioning the extent to 
which farmers are able to determine the shape of new bTB policies designed to give them 
choice. 
 
To begin with, of the two forms of wildlife intervention – badger vaccination and culling – 
the narrative of over-population is strongly consistent with preferences for badger culling and 
a clear reason why farmers reject badger vaccination. From a farmer’s perspective, badger 
numbers need to be reduced to help control bTB and, crucially, to also rebalance nature. 
Restoring this natural equilibrium explains why many favoured a badger cull. This was clear 
in farmers’ assessments of what to do about badger over-population. For example, farmers in 
Great Torrington argued that culling was the only way to rebalance nature:  
 
“It's nice to see a bit of wildlife but not too much. It’s like everything, it’s gotta be 
controlled hasn’t it. Don't let things get out of hand like” (GT1023). 
 
In this view, the problem is not so much bTB, but the population itself: reducing the number 
of badgers in the countryside is what is needed. By restoring nature to its natural level, the 
problem of bTB will also be dealt with. Other farmers argued that this could be achieved by 
simply lifting the 1993 Badger Protection Act: by lifting these protections, farmers could 
rebalance local badger populations as a way of ensuring bTB would not affect their cattle.  
The preference for culling was also based on a different form of balance – a kind of balance 
of fairness - which also reflected over-population arguments. Farmers felt that the 1993 
Badger Protection Act gave badgers special treatment and protection when it came to dealing 
with bTB. In particular, it was argued that there was unequal treatment between badgers and 
cows, with cows regularly slaughtered and badgers protected and not dealt with. As one dairy 
farmer from Great Torrington put it: 
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“…you have a reservoir of wildlife building up with it; none are being tested or 
controlled. There is no point in one sector hammering us if you don’t balance it out 
from where the disease comes from. Does the cow give it to the badger or does the 
badger give it to the cow? We are trying to eliminate it from the cows” (GT1049). 
 
In this argument, the balance of nature is extended to farm animals as well as wild animals. 
Both should be allowed to survive alongside each other, but there has to be fairness in how 
this balance is managed. Culling one animal whilst leaving the population of the other 
unchecked is not seen as a fair or an appropriate way to manage the disease. Nevertheless, 
there is a one-sidedness to this balance: few farmers said that disease was a result of there 
being too many cows and that the cattle population needs to be reduced or stocking densities 
lowered. Similarly, whilst farmers recognise facets of modern agriculture – such as growing 
maize – as a reason why the badger population has been able to grow, there was less 
unanimity that these practices should stop to restore the balance of nature. 
 
The over-population narrative leads to a rejection of badger vaccination in other ways, too. 
Simply, farmers believe that the population of badgers is such that it is just impractical to 
vaccinate each one. The majority of farmers surveyed argued that a 100% vaccination of the 
badger population would need to be achieved, which many felt would be impossible, as 
emphasised by the following quote: 
 
“It’s a wonderful idea, but how on earth is anybody in the world ever going to inject 
every badger, especially at the rate they breed. It's not going to happen is it, let’s be 
quite honest, it ain’t gonna happen” (GT1080). 
 
For this and other farmers, the sheer number of badgers meant that it would be impossible to 
conduct a rational and organised vaccination programme. Just as with vaccination of cattle, 
farmers believed that badgers would need to be tagged, coded and paperwork completed, and 
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that all badgers would need to be vaccinated to achieve herd immunity. Again, there is an 
element of balance and fairness here: farmers viewed badger vaccination in the same way as 
they would for their cattle, involving an ordered and recorded process. That this was not the 
case for badgers simply reinforced the view that there was ‘one rule for one and one for 
another’ (C1581) and that ultimately, if diseased cattle are slaughtered, so should diseased 
badgers be. 
 
However, this does not mean that badger culling was universally accepted by farmers. In fact, 
the tension between the two narratives of nature presented by farmers meant that many had 
trouble accepting the culling proposals offered to them by Defra. In particular, the distinction 
between clean and dirty badgers meant that some farmers were resistant to a cull on the basis 
that clean badgers acted as a natural defence. For example: 
 
“I’ve had a clear TB test and I believe from the clear TB test that the badgers on my 
farm or next door to my farm are clean and I want to protect them because they’ll 
keep the dirty ones away […] My badgers are protecting me and I will protect them, 
and I will, and I will, sincerely, I will protect them” (GT1046). 
 
Instead, farmers called for a targeted badger cull that focused on the identification of dirty 
setts, badgers and areas. In one area, a number of farmers mentioned a local farmer who was 
well-known for his knowledge of badger behaviour and his skills at identifying ‘clean’ and 
‘dirty’ setts. He advised one interviewee to protect his ‘clean’ badger sett “like gold dust” 
(GT1081). Farmers seemed to place more trust in this ‘local expert’ and his forms of lay 
ecology and epidemiology than formal bTB science, and believed that any cull would need to 
proceed along these lines. Not all farmers in the sample favoured a targeted cull. A minority 
argued the disease was now so endemic in certain ‘hot spot’ areas that a population approach 
to culling was what was required and were skeptical therefore about only culling 70% in an 
area. Nevertheless, there was almost universal criticism of the proposed culling method (free 
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shooting) of dealing with wild badgers. This view is summarized by one dairy farmer who 
argued that: “I don’t think shooting will work because if you shoot one the rest will disappear. 
You need to gas them. It’s okay to do an area. It might work, but it won’t if you shoot them 
because you won’t get them all” (GT1110). The majority of farmers thus favoured gassing as 
a more practical way to deal with the disease. As another farmer, in favour of a targeted cull, 
commented,  
 
“The most efficient way of dealing with a badger cull would be to do what they did 
years ago and gas the sett rather than free running shooting as I think that will lead to 
problems… If they can identify that they are diseased animals in those setts, they gas 
them and take the lot out” (S282).  
 
Narratives of nature therefore lead farmers to think about the control of bTB in wildlife in 
very specific ways. Beliefs in over-population and the loss of natural balance lead farmers to 
favour badger culling over vaccination as a way of restoring natural order. But, on the 
specifics of culling, farmers’ understandings of how disease is distributed unevenly lead 
many to favour a targeted cull. This preserves the natural defence of ‘clean’ badgers and 
preserves culling only infected badgers or cattle. Farmers were therefore critical of the 
choices available to them in the current wildlife control proposals. They welcomed the 
possibility to control badger numbers but felt that they have little room for manoeuvre 
regarding the specifics of the proposals. Rather than pursuing such a targeted cull, the licence 
agreements require at least 70% of badgers to be randomly culled using a method (free 
shooting) that many have significant practical concerns about. In opposition to their beliefs 
about nature, farmers are required to make a choice. For many farmers, the support of the cull 
is therefore made reluctantly. As indicated above, even those farmers involved in attempting 
to set up culling syndicates acknowledged that they had compromised their beliefs because, in 
their view, something had to be done about badgers. In the same way that critics of 
neoliberalism point out its varied form, so this solution reflects the continued power of the 
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State to impose solutions through the private sector, rather than the private sector possessing a 
free will to choose solutions that it prefers. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper shows how understandings of nature inform farmer preferences in respect of 
disease control options for bTB and assesses the extent to which the State has withdrawn and 
handed choice and control to farmers in new modes of neoliberal governance. Analyses of 
neoliberalism increasingly view it as an emergent outcome of negotiations and socio-political 
dynamics. Recent initiatives in bTB governance appear to signify a shift towards more 
market-based approaches to animal disease control. There is intent by the State to enable and 
encourage farmers to share costs and to take more responsibility for disease management. 
However, the composition of these new styles of governance reveals that state protection and 
control remains persistent and necessary (i.e. a minimal state model – Castree, 2008a). 
 
Farmer preferences to market options for wildlife interventions are also influenced by cultural 
understandings of disease and nature. This further complicates the management of bTB and 
reinforces the hybridity and messiness of neoliberalisation in this context. The majority of 
farmers interviewed for this study described badger populations as ‘out of control’ and ‘out of 
balance’. This imbalance was responsible for the spread of bTB and had been caused by the 
1993 Protection of Badgers Act. Balance was important in other ways too: farmers argued for 
a sort of natural justice in which badgers should be treated in the same way as cattle in disease 
management. The importance of balance and natural equilibrium are noted in other studies of 
wildlife management, but many farmers also described nature as variable and dynamic which 
both supports and challenges the relationship between natural balance and disease. In 
classifying badgers, fields and landscapes as ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’, farmers imagined a more 
variegated nature, with healthy animals and places to be found mingling with infected animals 
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despite the warnings of over-population. However, the spread of disease into these clean 
spaces and animals further reinforced farmers’ narratives of over-population and balance. 
These ‘lay ecologies’ of nature (Eden and Bear, 2011) are critical in terms of how farmers 
rationalise and respond to different neoliberal management options to control bTB. Farmers 
are in favour of badger culling because it will rebalance nature, whilst beliefs in the over-
population of badgers also rule out badger vaccination because of the large numbers of 
badgers that would need to be vaccinated and the associated cost and practical difficulties. 
 
However, the narratives of nature and disease presented by farmers do not always fit easily 
with the neoliberal solutions proposed by governments and challenge the extent to which 
farmers feel in control of disease management. Whilst farmers are given a choice of 
intervention methods, that choice is constrained by Government. Farmers expressed concerns 
about the licencing conditions for badger culling, suggesting that they are overly complicated 
and unlikely to work. Moreover, there exists no option for farmers to pursue the kind of 
targeted cull of ‘dirty’ badgers some would prefer. This highlights how one potential 
consequence of neoliberal reforms is that local beliefs about nature are ‘displaced’ (Braun, 
2007). As the paper shows, farmers base this targeted solution on craft knowledge and the 
country experience of those people that they trust. That there is no scientific evidence for a 
targeted approach is not a barrier for farmers, but the reliance on scientific evidence in the 
solutions created by Defra reveals the extent to which traditional forms of expertise and styles 
of state-led government continue to hold sway in the governance of animal disease. If bTB 
control was fully handed over to farmers, it is more likely that they would form a different set 
of solutions than is currently available to them. Farmers’ choice and control of disease is 
therefore limited: whilst they have some ability to choose between vaccination and culling, it 
is a restricted choice that has little resonance with farmers’ cultural understandings of disease. 
 
Farmers current perceptions of choice and their response to policy options are arguably more 
suggestive of command modes of classic bureaucracy rather than collaborative, partnership 
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modes of neoliberal regulation and governance. Animal disease control signifies a form of 
environmental management that requires some level of state intervention and responsibility 
(Castree, 2008a). Partnership modes of neoliberal governance for bTB are still in their 
infancy, but this lack of choice has two broader implications. Firstly, we might question the 
extent to which farmers will want to engage with devolved animal disease solutions in 
meaningful ways. The lack of direct engagement with farmers’ cultural understandings of 
disease may generate resistance to these plans. Alternatively, ambivalence to these controls 
may fail to engage farmers in broader discussions around disease control. As the experiences 
of other countries show, the eradication of disease requires the active engagement of farmers 
in a number of different aspects of disease control and not simply financial commitment to 
wildlife control (Enticott, 2013). 
 
Secondly, whilst the ‘roll out’ of neoliberalism in animal health governance and bTB is still at 
a relatively early stage, these findings suggest that neoliberalism’s reach into the governance 
of animal control is limited. Far from offering farmers choice and control of animal disease, 
the experiences of bTB so far have continued to place the State in direct control of how 
animal diseases are managed. At best, attempts to devolve power and responsibility to 
farmers reflect what Hodge and Adams (2012) call mutable forms of ‘institutional blending’ 
in which the involvement of the private sector is more than matched by continued significant 
degrees of State intervention. Nevertheless, there remain questions as to which farmers will 
engage with even these limited forms of devolved governance.  
 
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this paper reveals discourses of neoliberalism as 
control rather than choice when viewed from the perspective of farmer subjectivities and 
reveals the continued power of the State to impose solutions through the private sector, rather 
than the private sector possessing a free will to choose solutions that it prefers. 
Neoliberalisation operates in and forms part of the evolution of state and private 
responsibility. A spatially nuanced policy that reflects the heterogeneities of bTB (Atkins and 
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Robinson, 2013), including farmer understandings and local beliefs about nature, is desirable 
but may be difficult to achieve in practice through neoliberal styles of governing. 
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